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NOTES
DEVISE UPON ORAL TRUST FOR ILLEGAL OBJECT
Before considering the case of a devise upon an oral trust
for an illegal object let us review briefly the status of the primary case where the object is legal. A devises lanfi to B who
orally agrees to convey to C. B later refuses to convey. There
is no question of fraud,' undue influence, or duress 2 but merely
one of the breach of the oral promise. By the weight of authority in both England 3 and America, 4 C is entitled to recover
the property by virtue of a constructive trust imposed upon B.
Professor Scott has pointed out that such a result is violative of both the Statute of Frauds and the Wills Act.5 Such
a result is inconsistent with the result reached by the court in
cases where the transfer is inter vivos.& In those cases it
allows B to keep and refuses to raise a constructive trust for
either the grantor or the beneficiary.7 The supposed reason for
the American rule is the paramount policy of the Statute of
Frauds.8 But in the will cae where the policy is at least
doubly strong9 an exactly opposite result is reached.1 0 Professor Scott has pointed out that the proper thing to do in inter
1

If there is actual fraud there is. no question but -thatC may force
B to convey the property. Thynn v. Thynn (1874), 41 Conn. 197.
'Undue influence and duress stand on an equal footing with fraud.
Dixon v. Olm i (1787), 1 Cox.Eq. 414; Bulkley v. Wilford (1834), 2 C.
& F. 102. In these caset B is guilty of a tort to 0, and equity may properly give specific reparation for the tort by compelling B to convey to
C. 37 Harvard Law Review 653, 670.- The application of the tortspecific reparation doctrine to cases other than the above as Costigan
advocates in 12 Michigan Law Review 515, overlooks the fundamental
distinction between acts of misfeasance and acts of non-feasance, between tort and pahsive breach of contract. 20 Harvard Law Review
549, 554.

SOldzam v. Litchfteld (1705), 2 Vern. 506, 3 Yes. 39.
Caldwel v. Caidwbll (1871), 7 Bush (Ky.) 515.
37 Harvard Law Review 653, 673, note 58. The possibility of

selling out a contract between A and B is of little aid "for the only

consideration for B's agreement is the devolution of the property,

which does not take place until A is dead, and there can b6 no mutual

assent at that time by A and B. Id. 674.
637 Harvard Law Review 653, 665, note 37.
7Tilmanv. Kifer (1910), 166 Ala. 403, 52 So. 309.
' 37 Harvard Law Review 653, 659.
' Both the Statute of Frauds and the Wills Act are involved. And
the policy behind the Wills Act would appear even stronger than that
behind the Statute of Frauds.
" The practical considerations arising from the fact that A is dead
in the will case, whereas he is alive in the inter vivo& case, have quite

probably influenced the courts. 20 Harvard Law Review 549, 555.
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vivos and will cases alike is to raise a constructive trust for the
grantor or his heirs to prevent an unjust enrichment. 1" As in
analogous cases 12 the equitable machinery of restoring the
status quo is applied. The policy behind both the Statute of
Frauds and the Wills Act prevents us from going forward but
does not prevent us from going backward.
This leads to the problem of this note, namely, what if the
beneficiary of the oral trust is an illegal object? The courts
3
give the property back to the heirs of the testator.1
And as far as we can find this result has escaped criticism.
Izdeed Professor Scott says: "Obviously these decisions are
correct."1

4

But upon what reasoning do the courts reach the result?
With a single exception they do so by an analogy to the case
first discussed above where the object is legal. Every one of
the cases noted above in note 13 reaches the result by this pro-

37 Harvard Law Review 653, 667, 675.

12a. Deed absolute on its face may be shown by oral agreement -to.
be debt security.
b. If one piece of land is conveyed in consideration of an oral
promise to convey another piece of land, the former may be recovered
in equity.
c. If owner of mortgaged land which is about to be foreclosed Is
induced to refrain from preventing the sale by an oral promise of another to buy in the property and later reconvey, the former owner may
force a reconveyance upon payment.
d. If money is paid in consideration of an oral agreement to transfer land, there is a quasi-contractual obligation to restore the money.
13English-cases: Edwards v. Pike (1759), 1 Eden 267, 28 Reprint
687; Boson v. Statham (1760), 1 Eden 508, 28 Reprint 783; Mjckleston
v. Brown (1801), 6 Ves. Jr. 52, 31 Reprint 934; Stickland v. Alridge
(1804), 9 Ves. Jr. 516, 32 Reprint 703; Paine v. Hall (1812), 18 Ves. Jr.
475, 34 Reprint 397; Russell v. Jackson (1852), 10 Hare 204, 68 Reprint
900; Tee v. Ferris (1856), 2 K. & J. 357, 69 Reprint 819; Moss v. Cooper
(1861), 1 J. & H. 352, 70 Reprint 782; Rweeting v. Sweeting (1863), 10
Jur. N. S. 31; Springett v. Jennings (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 488; Rowbotham v. Dunnett (1878), L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 437; Re Spencer's Will
(1887), 57 L. T. 519; Geddis v. Semple (1903), 1 I. R. 73.
American cases: Kendrick v. Cole (1876), 61 Mo.' 572; Schultz's
Appeal (1876), 80 Pa. 396 (dicta only); O'Harav. Dudley (1884), 95 N.
Y. 403; O'Rielly's Appeal (1893), 154 Pa. 485, 26 Atl. 623 (dicta only);
Amherst College 1. Ritch (1897), 151 N. Y. 282, 45 N. E. 876; Edson v.
Bartel'(1897), 154 N. Y. 199, 48 N. E. 541; Stirk's Estate (1911), 232 Pa.
98, 81 Atl. 187; Casey v. Casey (1914), 161 App. Div., 146 N. Y. S. 348.
137 Harvard Law Review 653, 681.
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cess. There is a single exception furnished in an old English
case, which will be discussed later. 4 he variations of the method
employed group themselves into three classes. In the first class
are those courts which take the following steps in the process of
reasoning: (1) Raise a constructive trust for , the illegal object; (2) Declare a resulting trust for A's heirs because of the
failure of the gift due to illegality of object. Some of the courts
as the one which decided the leading case of Sweeting v. Sweeting 15 think aloud and expressly declare that this is the procedure. Still others, as patently though not as expressly, follow the same method. In the second class are those cases in
whicli the courts say they raise a constructive trust for the testator's heirs because of the illegality of the object.' 6 hi the
third class are those cases in which the courts declare the devise void because of the illegality of the objeet.' 7 In each and
all of the three classes the mental process is essentially the samo.
All such lases really confront the court with the alternative of'
declaring the gift ineffectual for one of two reasons, the Statute
of Frauds or the Wills Act on the one hand, the illegality of
the object on the other. Whenever the latter reason is chosen,
and with a single exception it has been chosen, the court is falling into the same faulty r'easdning as in tie cases where the object is legal.
Why then have such cases escaped criticism? The answer is
that the same result is reached as if the sounder process were
followed. Suppose we apply Professor Scott's procedure. Then
the intended trust would fail because within the prohibitions
of the Statute of Frauds or the Wills Act or both. The consideration of the fact that the object was illegal would not even be
156upra note 13. "Here, if it was not for the Statute of Mortmain,
as in the simple case put (where the object was legal), the charity
would be entitled to come into this'court and obtain a conveyance to
itself from the devisee.

., .

.

.

But since the Statute of Mortmain

Is in force and the secret trust was "for the benefit of a charity, which
charity cannot hold the lands, this court considers that there Is a resultIng trust in favor of the heir-at-law. There would be a resulting trust
in favor of the charity, except that the law says there shall be no secret
trust for a charitable purpose." See also Amherst (oltege v. Bitch,
supra note 13.
" Casey v. Casey, supra note 13.
""Boson v. Statham; pringett v. Jennings; Kendrick v. Core, all
supra note 13.
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reached. There would be the single step of raising a constructive trust for A's heirs to prevent an unjust enrichment. A
single case has adopted this reasoning. Even this case did not
go the whole route. In the case of Res v. Portington,decided
in 1693,18'there was an absolute devise and the question arose as
to whether or not such a devise could. be a trust for superstitous
uses, and the court held that no averment could be admitted
of such a trust under the Statute of Frauds. For reasons that
are not of importance here there was never a final adjudication
as to what should be done with the land under this decision.
Probably the devisee would have been allowed to keep at that
early date. But had there been a constructive trust raised for
the heirs-at-law of the testator to prevent an unjust enrichment,
the ease would be in strict accord with Professor Scott's view
both as to method and as to result.
Since the same result is reached by either method the distinction may appear rather technical. But it is not wholly so.
As is usual where -an illogical method is followed inconsistencies
arise. The inconsistencies which the process the courts actually
follow may lead to are aptly illustrated by the case of Sweeting
v. Sweeting, supra. In that case the illegal object was a charity
to which gifts by will were forbidden by the laws of mortmain.
In that case the court was forced to hold:
(1) That the disposition was not testamentary in so far
as to require it to be evidenced by- a duly attested will;
(2) That the disposition was testamentary in so far as
the laws of mortmain were concerned.
It has been noted that this and similar inconsistencies have
arisen from the decisions which are declared to be correct. But
it hs not been noted that these inconsistencies, or at least a part
of them, have arisen from the method employed in reaching the
decisions rather than from the decisions themselves. All of
these inconsistencies could be avoided if the process Professor
Scott advises were followed throughout.
As the law is at present the courts reach a correct result
when there is a devise upon an oral trust for an illegal object.
But the courts reach this correct result by a process of reason1 Salk 162, 91 Reprint 151.
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ing which is as inherently weak as is the process which has been
so severely and justly criticised when applied to cases where
there is a devise upon oral trust for a legal object.
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